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CASE NOTES
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-RIGHT TO WAGES
WHILE VOTING
Defendant was convicted of violating a Missouri statute' permitting an
employec to absent himself from work for four hours, without a deduc-
tion of wages, for the purpose of voting at a general election. The em-
ployee's working hours were from 8:00 A.M. to 4:30 P.M. and his salary
was based on an hourly wage. Defendant permitted employees to leave
work at 3:o0 p.M.; 2 however, such employees 'were only paid for the
actual time they worked. In affirming the defendant's conviction by an
eight to one decision, the United States Supreme Court held that the
statute did not violate the due process and equal protection clauses of the
Fourteenth Amendment or the contract clause of the Federal Constitu-
tion.3 Day-Brite Lighting, Inc. v. Missouri, 72 S. Ct. 405 (1952).
The nation's highest Court considered this statute to be in the form of a
minimum wage requirement, saying that although the purpose of the
statute differed from minimum wage legislation insofar as it did not tend
to protect the health and morals of the citizen, the Missouri legislature
intended to safeguard the right of suffrage by the exercise of police power,
which includes "political well-being." Prior decisions, said the court, have
held that the police power is to apply to all public needs which gives the
states power to legislate in the business-labor field within the broad limits
of specific constitutional prohibitions.
1 "Any person entitled to vote at any election in this state shall, on the day of such
election, be entitled to absent himself from any services or employment in which he
is then engaged or employed, for a period of four hours between the times of opening
and closing the polls; and such voter shall not, because of so absenting himself, be
liable to any penalty; . . . Any person or corporation who shall refuse -to any em-
ployee the privilege hereby conferred .... or shall cause any employee to suffer any
penalty or deduction of wages because of the exercise of such privilege . . . shall be
deemed guilty of a misdemeanor. . . ." Mo. Rev. Stat. 0949) c. 3z9, S o6o, formerly
Mo. Rev. Stat. (1897) S 11785. Arizona, California, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas,
Minnesota, Nebraska, New Mexico, New York, Ohio, South Dakota, Texas, West
Virginia, and Wyoming have similar statutes; Colorado and Utah allow no dockage
unless the employee is paid by the hour. Six states authorize the absence of employees
on election day but do not provide for payment of wages.
2The Missouri Court of Appeals held that the employee is not to be allowed a full
four hours leave of absence, but should only be allowed to leave his place of em-
ployment at such time that he is assured four hours to vote. Since the polls were
open from 6:oo A.M. to 7:00 P.M., the defendant was correct in permitting the em-
ployees to leave at 3:00 P.M. State v. Day-Brite Lighting, Z2o S.W. 2d 782 (Mo. App.,
1949).
3 U.S. Const. Art. i, S o.
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Justice Jackson, dissenting in the instant case, expressed the belief that
this statute should not have been compared to minimum wage legislation;
the mere fact that a state may compel payment of a wage for hours
worked does not give it power to compel payment for hours not worked.
Besides the Missouri decision which was affirmed in the principal case,
only a few states have decided the constitutionality of similar legislation.
New York held such a statute to be constitutional 4 while Illinois5 and
Kentucky" declared unconstitutional that portion of the statute requiring
the employer to pay the employee his wages while voting.
The Missouri court7 was of the opinion that the legislature intended to
secure free and open elections by requiring the employer not only to
permit the employee to have an opportunity to vote, but also to exercise
this right without a penalty or deprivation of wages. This legislative in-
tent to prevent an employer's dominion over an employee's right to vote
was considered, as People v. Ford Motor Co.S previously held, a further-
ance of public welfare.
The Illinois case of People v. Chicago, M. and St. P. Ry. Co.,9 decided
in 1923, was the first case to construe a statute similar to the one in ques-
tion. The court held that part of the statute requiring an employer to pay
an employee for exercising his right to vote to be an improper exercise of
police power because the statute was not regarded as one which promoted
the health and safety of any employee. Since the employer delivered his
property to the employee without justification or compensation, the
court concluded that the former was deprived of such property without
due process of law.
A Kentucky case, Illinois Cent. R. Co. v. Commonwealth,10 expressly
followed the Chicago, M. and St. P. Ry. case in declaring a similar statute
unconstitutional. The court held that the statute required the employer
group, rather than the general public, to maintain the public enterprise of
voting. Since the law does not sanction public maintenance of private
enterprise, neither should it necessitate private maintenance of a public
enterprise.
4 People v. Ford Motor Co., 271 App. Div. 141 , 63 N.Y.S. 2d 697 (1946). A superior
court of California has also declared a similar statute constitutional in Ballarini v.
Schlage Lock Co., 226 P. 2d 771 (Super. Ct., Calif., i95o), but this case has not been
reviewed in a higher court.
5 People v. Chicago, M. and St. P. Ry. Co., 306 Ill. 486, 138 N.E. 155 (1923). Ac-
cord: McAlpine v. Dimick, 326 Ill. 240, 157 N.E. 235 (1927).
6 Illinois Cent. R. Co. v. Commonwealth, 305 Ky. 632, 204 S.W. 2d 973 (1947), cert.
denied 334 U.S. 843 (1948). Accord: International Shoe Co. v. Commonwealth, 305
Ky. 636, 204 S.W. 2d 976 (1947).
7 State v. Day-Brite Lighting, 240 S.W. 2d 886 (Mo., 195).
8 271 App. Div. 141, 63 N.Y.S. 2d 697 (1946).
9 3o6 111. 486, 138 N.E. 155 (1923).
10305 Ky. 632, 204 S.W. 2d 973 (1947).
DE PAUL LAW REVIEW
The dissenting opinion in the Ford Motor case stated that the statute did
not require the employer to contribute funds for the benefit of the general
public but merely to enrich private individuals who give nothing in
return.
The problem involved in construing the "pay-as-you-vote" statutes is
whether the statute was enacted within the purview of a state's police
power. In the exercise of police power, the statute must be passed for the
protection of public welfare;1' this means that the legislature must protect
the public interest generally, not a particular class specifically. 12
Before the principal decision, the proponents of the statute in question
claimed that it would aid public morals. In reality, the statute may have
had negative results as to the furtherance of these; a person should not
enter the voting booth "feeling that he is an employee in his master's
service and on the payroll at the time he is doing that which he should
only do as a citizen."'18 Therefore, if the statute did not increase the pub-
lic morals, public welfare ceased to be the object of such legislation, and,
as the Illinois and Kentucky cases have held, the statute resulted in an
improper exercise of police power.
However, in the principal case, the Court seems to depart from prior
judicial determination of the problem through an examination of the
statute's effect on public morals. The Court states, ". . . the purpose of the
legislation ... is not the protection of the health and morals of the citi-
zen." 14 In approaching the problem, the Court reasoned:
The public welfare is a broad and inclusive concept. The moral, social, eco-
nomic, and physical well-being of the community is one part of it; the political
well-being, another. The police power which is adequate to fix the financial
burden for one is adequate for the other.15
Justice Jackson, in a satirical manner, stated:
I do not question that the incentive which this statute offers will help swell
the vote; to require that employees be paid time-and-a-half would swell it still
more and double-time would do even better .... Perhaps some plan will be
forthcoming to pay the farmer by requiring his mortgagee to rebate some pro-
portion of the interest on the farm mortgage if he will vote.' 6
However, Jackson goes further than mere satire for he considers getting
out the vote to be the voter's or the state's business, not the employer's.
It is interesting to note that the statute in question was passed in 1897, at
11 Hertz Drivurself Stations v. Siggins, 359 Pa. 25, 58 A. zd 464 (i948).
12 Lawton v. Steele, 152 U.S. 133 (1894).
Is Dissenting opinion of Justice Vandeventer in State v. Day-Brite Lighting, 240
S.W. 2d 886, 9o (Mo., 195').
14 Day-Brite Lighting, Inc. v. Missouri, 72 S. Ct. 45 (1952).
15 Ibid., at 4o8. 16 Ibid., at 409.
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a time when the average worker labored from ten to sixteen hours per
day. The average worker today is employed eight hours a day while the
polls are usually open from ten to fourteen hours. Therefore, modern
working conditions coupled with the increased speed of transportation
seem to antiquate the practical necessity for the type of legislation
involved.
The probable effect of upholding the constitutionality of "pay-as-you-
vote" statutes will be to increase the number of voters. 17 But the success of
an enticement to vote does not seem to justify putting its cost on some
other citizen.
PUBLIC LAW-ILLINOIS LIQUOR CONTROL ACT
CREDIT RESTRICTIONS
The plaintiffs, Max Weisberg, a retail liquor dealer, and Stag Beer
Corporation, an Illinois wholesale beer distributor, brought suit against
the Illinois Liquor Control Commission seeking a declaratory judgment
that the Illinois statutory prohibition on the sale of liquor on credit was
unconstitutional.' On appeal by plaintiff Weisberg only, the Illinois Su-
preme Court upheld the constitutionality of the statute complained of.
Weisberg v. Taylor, 409 Ill. 384, ioo N.E. 2d 748 (i951).
Plaintiff's main contention was that the credit provisions 2 of the Illinois
Liquor Control Act were unreasonable and confiscatory in that they cre-
ated an arbitrary and discriminatory classification against retail licensees in
requiring them to buy beer for cash but permitting distributors to pur-
chase the same on credit. The plaintiff asserted that such a class discrimi-
nation contravenes Section 2 of Article IIs of the Illinois Constitution and
17 In June, 1948, the United States Supreme Court refused certiorari for the Ken-
tucky case which had struck down the "pay-as-you-vote" statute. The poor turn-
out of voters in the 1948 presidential election may have influenced the present de-
cision in this presidential election year of 1952.
1Ill. Rev. Stat. (949) c. 43,§ 122.
2Ibid. The provisions of the statute pertinent to the constitutionality issues here
involved are: (a) it is unlawful for any retailer to accept, receive, or borrow money
or anything of value, or accept or receive credit from any manufacturer or distribu-
tor, except ordinary merchandising credit for a period not to exceed thirty days;
(b) a retailer who is delinquent in his merchandising account for thirty days or more
is forbidden from purchasing or acquiring alcoholic liquor, and a manufacturer or
distributor is forbidden from knowingly granting or extending credit or selling alco-
holic liquors to such delinquent dealers; (c) the purchase price of beer sold to a
retailer must be paid in cash on or before delivery of the beer; (d) beer sold to dis-
tributors or importing distributors shall be paid for in cash on or before fifteen days
after the delivery of the beer.
3 i. Const. Art. a, § z: "No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property,
without due process of law."
